Wright's Essay - "Can Machines Think?"

In his essay, Wright explains the debate over whether machines can possess consciousness. The views of many philosophers that he presents all come together to show the bigger problem; that consciousness is a more complex puzzle than we previously thought. This means that it will take manipulation of many different theories to even come close to explaining consciousness. As Chalmers sates, a solution to the consciousness puzzle, “will require recognizing that consciousness is something over and above the physical and then building a theory some might call metaphysical,” (Wright, 146).

Consciousness has somewhat been depicted in machines on the most simple of levels. A robot may be able to combine physical sensation with the knowledge that what it is touching may be harmful. Basically, when touching an object, a “data package” will be sent to the machine’s brain, which is similar to the way that humans perceive touch. The brain will then give feedback on whether or not to recoil from the object. This process is based completely on the physical level, not considering the subjective experience of feelings that humans have. But what role does the subjective experience play? Is this subjective experience of consciousness just something that is extra and unnecessary? While it seems like this experience may not have a huge importance, it is a combination of all of these subjective experiences that makes human life worthwhile. Without being able to feel and experience anything, we would all just go through the motions, and function completely like robots.

Wright also explains the model called pandemonium. This model suggests that when we process something visually or auditorally, we create competing views about what the stimulus might be. We weigh the options based on experience and factual knowledge and the “winning theory” becomes a part of our consciousness. This model can already be depicted in robots. As Wright states, “it’s a plausible theory of data flow in the human brain, and of the criteria by which the brain admits some data, but not other data, to consciousness,” (Wright, 145). So we know that robots can get to putting things into consciousness, but can they have a subjective experience? Wright leaves the answer to this question up in the air. Although we can think about consciousness, due to limitations within our minds, we may not ever be able to grasp such things as a physical explanation for subjective experience.